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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Juan Carlos Diaz-Arevalo, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for murder with the use of a dangerous 
weapon, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004), 
possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (a) (West 2004), and domestic violence in 
the presence of a child, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas? 
Standard of Review. "Challenges to a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea invite multiple standards of review/7 State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, \ 7,140 
P.3d 1288. The appellate court "will overturn a sentencing court's ruling on a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea only when [it is] convinced that the [trial] court 
has abused its discretion/' Id. The Court "will disturb findings of fact made in 
connection with a ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if they are 
clearly erroneous." Id. However, "'the ultimate question of whether the 
[sentencing] court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural 
requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness/" Id. at % 8 (quoting State v. Kittle, 2004 UT 46, \ 4,94 P.3d 268). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§ 76-5-203. Murder 
* * * 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of 
another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference 
to human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk 
of death to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted 
commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted 
commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate 
offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is 
killed in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or 
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immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the 
predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in 
the commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful 
arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace 
officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the 
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is 
established under Section 76-5-205.5. 
* * * 
RULE 11. PLEAS 
* * * 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty 
and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to 
compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, 
these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient 
if it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the 
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
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(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and 
if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the 
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court 
has established that the defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot 
understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement 
has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
Following the fatal shooting of Lindsey Rae Fawson, defendant was charged 
with (1) murder using a dangerous weapon, a first degree felony; (2) possession or 
use of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony; (3) domestic violence 
in the presence of a child, a third degree felony; and (4) possession of 
raethamphetamine, a third degree felony. R. 44-47. Following a preliminary 
hearing, defendant was bound over to stand trial on all four counts. R. 52-54,129. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the first three charges and 
the State dismissed the methamphetamine charge. R. 66-76. The State also agreed 
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to dismiss the charges in case numbers 051906480 FS and 05190711FS.1 R.66. Also 
in exchange for defendant's plea, the United States Attorney's Office agreed "not to 
charge or seek indictment against [defendant] for the crimes of Aggravated Illegal 
Reentry and Felon in Possession of a Firearm and/or Ammunition." R. 70,74. The 
U.S. Attorney's agreement provided, however, that "should the defendant... seek 
to withdraw his plea or challenge his plea at a later date, the government would no 
longer be bound by [the] agreement and would seek indictment on said charges." 
R.74. 
Three days before sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. R. 85-86. Prior to sentencing, the trial court heard argument from the parties 
and denied defendant's motion. R. 106. The court thereafter sentenced defendant to 
consecutive prison terms of six years to life for murder, one-to-fifteen years for 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person, and zero-to-five years for domestic 
violence in the presence of a child. R. 106-07. Defendant timely appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court. R. 110-11. The supreme court transferred the appeal to this 
Court pursuant to rule 42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 127-28. 
1
 The record does not identify the charges in these two cases, but the Court 
may take judicial notice of the court docket in each case. In Case No. 051906480 FS, 
defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a first degree felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor, and two motor vehicle violations. In Case No. 05190711 FS, 
defendant was charged with damaging jail property, a third degree felony. 
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B. Statement of Facts2 
Defendant, known as "Blue," began dating Lindsey Rae Fawson in 2005, and 
the two lived with each other for a couple of months. R. 129: 8. But they frequently 
fought and the two separated by mid-May. See R. 129: 10-11. While they were 
together, defendant had given Lindsey a car. R. 129:15. After they separated, the 
car became a source of contention. Defendant wanted it back, but Lindsey refused. 
See R. 129:15,48. Defendant threatened to take the car from Lindsey, but she would 
remove the fuse so that it would not start. R. 129:15. 
On the morning of May 16, 2005, Lindsey and her sister Stacey rode with 
Stacey's boyfriend to a dollar store in Draper, and then to a parking lot in Murray, 
where the three "got high" smoking crystal methamphetamine. R. 129:11-13,34,55. 
After smoking the crystal meth, the three drove to Midvale and picked up Lindsey's 
son Elijah from school. R. 129: 13. After making a second stop at a dollar store, 
Stacey's boyfriend dropped off Stacey, Lindsey, and Elijah at a friend's home in 
Draper where they had stayed the night before. R. 129: 13. The three left in 
Lindsey's car, drove to McDonald's, and then dropped Elijah off at his 
grandmother's work in Midvale. R. 129:14-15. Lindsey and Stacey then drove to 
Stacey's storage unit, removed some clothes from the trunk, and placed them in 
Stacey's storage unit. R. 129:16. 
2
 The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing. 
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After dropping off the clothes, Lindsey and Stacey drove to a friend's house in 
Murray, where the friend "fronted Lindsey a . . . teener of [crystal meth]." See R. 
129:17-18, 33-34,122. Defendant, who happened to be in the neighborhood, saw 
Lindsey's car at the friend's house. R. 129: 99. As the sisters visited their friend, 
defendant grabbed his sawed-off shotgun, loaded it, and crawled inside the trunk of 
Lindsey's car. R. 129: 99. Lindsey and Stacey returned to the car soon after, drove 
to their father's house, where they picked up Lindsey's three-year-old son Isaiah, 
and then returned to their friend's house in Draper. R. 129:19-20. 
After arriving at the house in Draper, Lindsey opened the trunk to get a pair 
of pants. R. 129:20-21,36-37. When she did so, defendant jumped out of the trunk 
with the shotgun and pointed it at Lindsey. R. 129: 21. When Lindsey fled at the 
sight of the shotgun, defendant got into the driver's seat of the car exclaiming that 
he wanted his "f—ing car." R. 129: 21-22, 37-38. When defendant started the 
engine, Stacey, who was still sitting in the front passenger seat, removed the keys 
from the ignition and they dropped to the floor. R. 129:22-23,36,40. At that point, 
Lindsey returned, confronted defendant, and managed to get back into the driver's 
seat. R. 129: 23, 39. Defendant repeatedly yelled that he wanted his "f—ing car" 
and told Lindsey that he was "going to f—ing kill" her. R. 129:23,38. As he did so, 
he was pointing the shotgun at Lindsey. R. 129: 24. 
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As Lindsey's three-year-old boy cried in the backseat, Stacey exited the car, 
went around to the driver's side, and tried to convince Lindsey to let defendant 
have the car. R. 129: 24-25, 39,40,49-50. Lindsey refused. R. 129: 25. Defendant 
tried to pull Lindsey out of the car, but she pushed him away. R. 129:50-51. Then, 
holding the gun with two hands, defendant pointed it at Lindsey and said he was 
"going to f—ing kill' her," if she did not give him back his car. R. 129:24,49,52-53. 
Stacey, whose head was turned, then heard Lindsey cry, "No, Blue" and the sound 
of a shotgun blast. R. 129: 25. Lindsey died almost immediately from the single 
close range shotgun blast to her face. R. 129: 55-58. 
Upon seeing her sister shot in the face, Stacey cried, "Oh, my God, Blue! 
What did you do? What have you done?" R. 129:41. Defendant turned to Lindsey 
in a "scared" look and then shot at Stacey as she ran to the back of the car, assumed 
a fetal position on the ground, and pleaded, "No." R. 129: 25-26, 42-43. After 
defendant missed, Stacey got up and ran towards a man who had emerged from his 
backyard to find out what had happened. See R. 129: 26, 43-44. As Stacey ran 
toward the man, defendant shot at them both, but missed, and the two immediately 
went to the ground. R. 129: 26,44. Defendant then ran away. R. 129: 26. Stacey 
was transported to Alta View Hospital, but released after medical personnel 
concluded she was uninjured. R. 129: 27-28. She then went to the Draper City 
police station to submit a report. R. 129: 27. 
8 
Police apprehended defendant the following morning. A search dog alerted 
on defendant in a thicket of bushes next to a shed located near the murder scene. R. 
129: 71-73, 79. When the dog attacked defendant, his shotgun fired, but after the 
dog bit defendant, he surrendered. R. 129:71-74,79,85-86. A search of defendant at 
the Draper City police station uncovered an unexpended shotgun shell and crystal 
meth. R. 129: 93-95,108. 
Defendant was transported to the West Valley City police station for 
questioning. R. 129: 95. After defendant waived his Miranda rights, police 
interviewed him about the shooting. R. 129: 95-97. Defendant complained that 
Lindsey had stolen his personal belongings, his meth, and his car. R. 129:97-98. He 
admitted that when he saw the car parked at a friend's house in Murray, he grabbed 
his sawed-off shotgun, loaded it with three shells, and crawled inside the trunk. R. 
129:99-102. He said he brought the shotgun because he had previously tried to get 
his things back from Lindsey, but was unsuccessful. R. 129:101-03. He said that 
when Lindsey opened the trunk, he jumped out with his sawed-off shotgun and 
demanded that she return his car and other things. R. 129: 100-02. He said that 
when he got into the car and tried to start it, Lindsey began hitting him and trying to 
get him out of the car. R. 129:102-03. Defendant yelled at Stacey that he wanted his 
things back. R. 129: 012-03. He admitted that he held the shotgun in both hands 
and pointed it at Lindsey before the gun fired. R. 129:103-04. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant did not allege a rule 11 
or due process violation. His motion was instead based on his post-plea conclusion 
that he would not risk additional prison time on federal charges if he went to trial in 
this case and faced the charges by the U.S Attorney's Office. Accordingly, 
defendant cannot prevail on his rule 11 and due process claims on appeal unless he 
shows plain error. He has not done so. 
In 2003, section 77-13-6 was amended, providing that a guilty plea may be 
withdrawn only upon leave of court and a showing that the plea was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made. This amendment effectively abolished the strict compliance 
rule, which arose from the statute's previous provision that a guilty plea could be 
withdrawn upon a showing of "good cause." Defendant has not demonstrated that 
his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
Although the trial court did not advise defendant of the mens rea element of 
depraved indifference murder in its recitation of the elements (that defendant 
knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another), the 
record demonstrates that he understood the nature and elements of the offense. 
Defendant agreed with the State's factual basis, which provided that "defendant 
used a sawed-off shotgun and aimed it at the victim, Lindsey Fawson, pulled the 
trigger, and it caused her death/7 R. 130:8-9. Defendant therefore admitted to facts 
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that not only supported a knowing mental state, but an intentional mental state as 
well. Based on this factual basis, the court could infer that defendant understood 
that the State would be required to prove, at least, that he knew his conduct created 
a grave risk of death to another. Given the factual basis for the plea, defendant's 
letter acknowledging that he knew he was wrong in pulling out the gun during the 
altercation, and defendant's admission to police that he aimed the gun at Lindsey, it 
cannot be said that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendant understood 
the nature and elements of the offense. Certainly, any error was not obvious. 
Even assuming arguendo there was obvious error, defendant has not 
established harm, i.e., but for the court's omission, he would not have pled guilty. 
An examination of defendant's motion to withdraw and his argument on that 
motion reveals that he pled guilty based on his trial counsel's advice that he would 
avoid additional prison time arising from the federal charges. He only moved to 
withdraw when a different attorney told him that he would not serve more prison 
time on the federal charges. In short, the plea was all about avoiding additional 
consequences, not the elements of the offense, which the evidence overwhelmingly 
established. Even had the issue been preserved, rule 11 requires the same prejudice 
showing as plain error. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
Defendant pled guilty to criminal homicide under the depraved indifference 
alternative of section 76-5-203 of the Utah Code. Under that section, a person 
commits depraved indifference murder if, "acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another/' Utah Code 
Ann. § 76~5-203(2)(c) (West 2004). In reciting the elements, the plea affidavit tracked 
this language almost verbatim, R. 67, as did the trial court at the plea hearing when 
it informed defendant of the elements of the offense, R. 130: 6-7. In addition, 
defendant agreed with the State's factual basis for the plea, i.e., "defendant used a 
sawed-off shotgun and aimed it at the victim, Lindsey Fawson, pulled the trigger, 
and it caused her death." R. 130: 8-9. 
Because the statute does not identify the mens rea for depraved indifference 
murder, neither the plea affidavit nor the plea colloquy referred to a mens rea 
element when reciting the elements of the offense. But in State v. Fontana, the Utah 
Supreme Court "superimposed" a mens rea requirement for depraved indifference 
murder, holding that "the defendant [must have] acted with knowledge that his 
conduct created a grave risk of death to another." 680 P.2d 1042,1046-47 (Utah 
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1984); accord State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254,263-64 (Utah 1988).3 Defendant argues 
that because this element was not identified in either the plea affidavit or the plea 
colloquy, the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendant "understood] the 
nature and elements of the offense to which the plea [was] entered/' as required 
under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure- Aplt. Brf. at 13-17, 23-27. 
Defendant also argues that the court's failure to expressly identify the mens rea 
element for depraved indifference murder violated his due process right to 
understand the true nature of the charge against him. Aplt. Brf. at 28-35. 
Defendant's claims fail. 
A, Defendant must show plain error because he did not preserve his 
rule 11 and due process claims below. 
In his motion to withdraw, defendant did not claim that he did not 
understand the elements and nature of the crime, in violation of rule 11 and due 
process. Instead, he made vague complaints about his trial counsel's representation: 
When a guilty plea is entered, the defendant must be "fully informed 
of his rights prior to pleading guilty' in order for the plea to be 
knowing and voluntary." [Defendant] believes that his interests have 
not been adequately represented by counsel throughout the 
proceedings. He does not feel as though counsel has substantially 
represented his position. Hence, Defendant believes his plea was not 
-3 
In its last session, the Utah Legislature amended the depraved indifference 
murder alternative to require that "the actor knowingly engage[ ] in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another." 2007 Utah Laws ch. 340. The amendment 
went into effect less than 30 days ago. Id. (effective April 30,2007). 
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"knowingly" made. [Defendant] has further expressed his concerns in 
a letter filed with the court. 
R. 85-86 (internal citations omitted). 
Defendant shed light on these vague complaints when he spoke to the motion 
prior to sentencing. He stated that he moved to withdraw his plea because he 
wanted to "clear [himjself up," that "what happened was an accident." R. 132: 5.4 
He said that he took the plea deal because his trial counsel led him to believe that if 
he did not take the deal, he would do more time in prison on the federal charges 
(which the U.S. Attorney agreed not to pursue under the deal). R. 132:6; see also R. 
132:11 ("I thought it was the best deal for me because of what my lawyer told me; 
that if I didn't plead to the deal, that I was gonna do more time than I was supposed 
to do"). He explained, however, that since his plea, an attorney at the prison told 
him that he would not do more time on the federal charges. R. 132: 6-7. He 
explained that after seeking this advice, he "change [d] [his] mind" about the deal. 
R. 132:11. The court denied defendant's motion and proceeded to sentencing. R. 
132:15. 
4
 The letter referenced in defendant's motion also claimed that the shooting 
was an accident—that while the gun was pointed down, Lindsey kicked it up and 
"the impact of her kicks caused the gun to go off." R. 78. However, the letter was 
originally filed in anticipation of sentencing and requested concurrent sentences. R. 
80. In the letter, defendant acknowledged that he pulled the gun out and that he 
was holding it during the altercation. R. 78-79. He also stated in the letter that he 
"know[s] he did wrong by having the gun" during the altercation. R. 79. 
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The foregoing did not put the trial court on notice of the alleged rule 11 and 
due process violations. Indeed, defendant never suggested that he was entitled to 
withdraw his plea based on an alleged failure to strictly comply with rule 11 or 
because the plea colloquy or plea affidavit omitted, in reciting the elements, the 
mens rea element for depraved indifference murder. Thus, contrary to defendant's 
argument on appeal, Apli Brf. at 23-25, 34, defendant's rule 11 and due process 
claims were not preserved below. Because defendant did not preserve his claims 
below, he must show plain error on appeal. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f l 13-14, 
95 P.3d 276 (holding that because defendant did not adequately raise his rule 11 
claim in his motion to withdraw, he must show plain error). 
B. Defendant has not shown that the trial court plainly erred in denying 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
'To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (hi) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant.'" Id. at \ 15 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,f13,10 
P.3d 346). Defendant has failed to meet this burden. 
1. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant 
understood the nature and elements of depraved indifference 
murder. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the trial court's rule 11 duty "as a 
duty of 'strict' compliance." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,f11,22 P.3d 1242 (citations 
15 
omitted). The rule of strict compliance arose from the "good cause" requirement of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999), which provided that "[a] plea of guilty or no 
contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." 
(emphasis added). See State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 n.l (Utah App. 1994) 
(recognizing that failure to strictly comply with rule 11 establishes good cause for 
withdrawal of plea as a matter of law). However, the statute was amended in 2003 
and now provides that "[a] plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004) (emphasis added). The purpose of rule 11 
remains the same: "to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby 
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty." Visser, 2000 
UT 88, % 11. However, strict compliance is no longer the rule. The question is 
simply whether the plea was "knowingly and voluntarily made." Id. A review of 
the record here reveals that it was. 
Defendant was advised and acknowledged an understanding that the State 
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant "engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another person." R. 130: 6-7, 9; see 
also R. 395: 67-69. As noted, defendant was not expressly advised of the 
"superimposed" element that he knew his conduct created a grave risk of death. 
This, however, is not the end of the inquiry. In making its finding, the trial court 
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was not limited to its recitation of the elements. The court was also permitted to 
"tak[e] into account other record factors in making its findings/7 Visser, 2000 UT 88, 
% 12. In this case, the Court need look no further than the factual basis for the plea 
as support for the trial court's finding that defendant had a "conceptual 
understanding" of the nature and elements of the offense. See State v. Corwell, 2005 
UT28,f 18,114P.3d569. 
As a factual basis for the depraved indifference plea, the prosecutor stated 
that "defendant used a sawed-off shotgun and aimed it at the victim, Lindsey Fawson, 
pulled the trigger, and it caused her death." R. 130: 8 (emphases added). When the 
court asked defendant if he agreed with the proffered facts, he responded in the 
affirmative. See R. 130: 8-9.5 Defendant thus admitted to facts that not only 
supported a knowing mental state, but an intentional mental state as well. Based on 
this factual basis, the trial court could infer that the defendant understood that the 
State would be required to prove, at least, that he knew his conduct created a grave 
risk of death to Lindsey. See State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992) (pre-
Gibbons case relying in part on defendant's agreement with prosecutor's factual 
5
 The court asked defendant, "[D]o you disagree with any parts of the proffer, 
or are you willing to accept that as an accurate description of the facts in this case? 
Mr Diaz?" R. 130: 8-9. Apparently responding to the first part of the question— 
whether he disagreed with the proffer—defendant answered, "No, your Honor." R. 
130: 9. To clarify, the court asked, "You would agree with that?" R. 130: 9. 
Defendant responded, "Yes." R. 130: 9. 
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basis for the plea in upholding trial court's finding that defendant knowingly 
engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death). 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's proffer that he aimed the gun at 
Lindsey and pulled the trigger "does not inescapably imply volition or conscious 
choice." Aplt. Brf. at 16. To the contrary, to "aim" means to "direct or point (as a 
weapon or missile) at or so as to hit an object" or "the pointing of a weapon (as a 
gun) at an object intended to be hit (to take ~ at the target)," or simply, "to have as a 
purpose." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 45 (1993). Therefore, the facts 
proffered by the State not only implied knowledge that defendant's conduct created 
a grave risk of death, but also implied the greater mental state that he intended to 
cause Ms. Fawson's death. Having agreed with the prosecutor's facts supporting an 
intentional murder, defendant cannot plausibly claim that he did not understand 
that the State was required to prove that he knew his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another. This is especially true where defendant also admitted to police 
that he was holding the gun with both hands and pointing it at Lindsey when it 
fired. R. 129:103-04. 
Moreover, while in his sentencing letter defendant claimed the shooting was 
an accident, he acknowledged that he pulled out the shotgun, that he "kn[e]w [he] 
did wrong by having the gun," and that he was therefore "taking full responsibility 
for [his] actions." R. 79. This letter is evidence that counsel made him aware of the 
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mens rea element of depraved indifference murder and that his conduct was 
sufficient to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder. It follows that 
for this reason, defendant pled guilty to the depraved indifference alternative rather 
than the other two alternatives, which both require intentional conduct. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a)-(b) (West 2004). 
2. Any error was not obvious. 
Because defendant agreed with the State's proffer that he aimed the shotgun 
at Lindsey and pulled the trigger, it cannot be said that the trial court obviously 
erred in failing to expressly advise him that the State would be required to prove 
that he knew he was creating a grave risk of death to another. One cannot aim a 
loaded weapon at another and pull the trigger without knowing that such conduct 
creates a grave risk of death. 
3. Defendant has not demonstrated that any error was prejudicial. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court committed obvious error, 
defendant's claim fails because he has not demonstrated that any such error was 
harmful. "Under the plain error doctrine, a defendant must not only demonstrate 
that the error was obvious, but also that it was harmful or 'of such a magnitude that 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant."' Dean, 
2004 UT 63, \ 22 (quoting State v. Evans, 2001UT 22, \ 16,20 P.3d 888). In Dean, the 
Utah Supreme Court explained that "[t]his harmfulness test is equivalent to the 
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prejudice test applied in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel/' Id. 
Defendant must therefore "show a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (brackets supplied in 
Dean) (other quotations and citations omitted). In other words, defendant must 
"show that any error by the court actually 'affected the outcome of the plea 
process/" Id. at f23 . Defendant has failed to meet this burden. 
Defendant points only to his motion to withdraw as evidence of prejudice, 
observing that he "sought to withdraw his plea precisely because he intended no 
harm; the shooting was an accident." Aplt. Brf. at 27,35; R. 132:7. But as discussed 
above, depraved indifference murder does not require a showing of intent to harm. 
It simply requires a showing that defendant knew his conduct created a grave risk 
of death to another. See Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1046-47; Standiford, 769 P.2d at 263-64. 
The motion, therefore, does nothing to suggest that defendant would not have pled 
guilty had he been expressly advised that depraved indifference requires a showing 
that defendant knew his conduct created a grave risk of death. 
The record, in fact, demonstrates that a reading of the mens rea element by 
the court would not have influenced defendant's decision to plead guilty. 
Defendant's argument on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea reveals that his 
decision to plead guilty was not the product of any misunderstanding of the law, 
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but of defendant's desire to avoid additional prison time on federal charges, which 
the U.S. Attorney's Office agreed not to pursue if he pled guilty. Only when an 
attorney at the prison advised him that he would not face more prison time on a 
conviction for the federal charges (a position contrary to his trial counsel's advice), 
did defendant seek to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 132: 6-7. Defendant explained: 
[A]t the time that I pled to this deal, at the time I thought that it was 
the best thing for me. But like I told you, I was seeking legal advice 
and that's how—that's what made me change my mind. 
* * * 
I thought it was the best deal for me because of what my lawyer 
told me; that if I didn't plead to the deal, that I was gonna do more 
time than I was supposed to do. 
R. 132:11. 
Defendant's decision to plead guilty was undoubtedly also influenced by the 
strength of the State's case against him. It was overwhelming. The preliminary 
hearing testimony established that defendant crawled into the trunk of Lindsey's car 
with a loaded, sawed-off shotgun while Lindsey was visiting a friend in Murray. 
See R. 129:21,99,101-02. After Lindsey left the Murray residence, drove to another 
friend's house in Draper, and opened the trunk, defendant jumped out of the trunk 
and pointed his shotgun at Lindsey, demanding the return of his car. R. 129:19-21, 
36-37. Lindsey fled, but returned after defendant got into the car. R. 129:22-23,29, 
37-39. After Lindsey managed to pull defendant out of the car and get back in, 
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defendant held the gun with both hands, aimed it at Lindsey, and said he was 
"going to f—ing kill her" if she did not give him back his car, but she refused. R. 
129: 24,49,52-53. Lindsey's sister, who had turned her head, then heard Lindsey 
cry, "No, Blue," and immediately thereafter heard a shotgun blast. R. 129: 25. 
Lindsey died almost immediately from the shotgun blast to her face. R. 129:55-58. 
Defendant then fired at Lindsey's sister twice, but fortunately missed. R. 129:25-26, 
43-44. The evidence, therefore, overwhelmingly established not simply depraved 
indifference murder, but intentional murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (a) 
(West 2004). 
In sum, defendant pled guilty to depraved indifference murder to avoid 
additional incarceration in federal prison and to appease his claim that he did not 
intend to kill Lindsey. Given these aims and the overwhelming evidence 
supporting the murder charge, nothing in the record suggests that defendant would 
not have pled guilty had the court expressly stated that depraved indifference 
murder required a showing that defendant knew his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another. Indeed, defendant as much as admitted that he knew he created a 
grave risk of death to Lindsey in his sentencing letter and when he confessed to 
police that he aimed the shotgun at Lindsey before it fired. 
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C. Harmless error analysis also applies to preserved claims of rule 11 
violations. 
Even assuming arguendo that defendant had preserved his rule 11 claim 
below and that a rule 11 violation by itself constituted error, he would still be 
required to show that the error was harmful, i.e., '"absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant/' Dean, 2004 
UT 63,115 (quotations and citation omitted). 
In 2005, a harmless error provision was added to rule 11, providing that 
"[a]ny variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. ll(k). Contrary to 
defendant's argument, subsection (k) was not added to "clarif [y] what constitutes 
strict compliance with rule 11(e)." Aplt. Brf. at 20-22. The rule tracks the language 
of rule 30, which also provides that "[a]ny . . . variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Utah 
courts have universally interpreted rule 30 in the same way the Utah Supreme Court 
in Dean interpreted the harmless error rule for plain error: the error is harmless if it 
"'is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected 
the outcome of the proceedings/" State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219, \ 19,138 P.3d 90 
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(Utah App. 2006) (quoting State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, <f 20,20 P.3d 888). Rule ll(k) 
should likewise be so interpreted.6 
This interpretation of rule 11 is consistent with that given by several federal 
circuit courts of appeal to its federal counterpart. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 
420 F.3d 111, 131-33 (2nd Cir. 2005) (rule 11 error will not permit a defendant to 
withdraw his plea if it "can be deemed harmless because it would not have affected 
the defendant's decision to plead guilty"); United States v. Suarez, 155 F.3d 521,524 
(5th Cir. 1998) (a defendant may withdraw his plea if a rule 11 variance affects a 
"substantial right[]," in that "'the defendant's knowledge and comprehension of the 
full and correct information would have been likely to affect his willingness to plead 
guilty'") (citation omitted); United States v. Richardson, 121 F.3d 1051,1059 (7th Cir. 
1997) ("[t]he harmlessness inquiry focuses on 'whether the defendant's knowledge 
and comprehension of the full and correct information would have been likely to 
affect his willingness to plead guilty'") (citation omitted.). 
The same reason for requiring a defendant to prove prejudice in ineffective-
assistance and plain error challenges to a plea applies to preserved challenges to a 
plea. A defendant has suffered no infringement of his rights when the plea court 
6
 In State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 22, 69 P.3d 838, this Court held that it 
will presume harm when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his 
constitutional rights under rule 11, but that decision was effectively overruled by 
Dean. 
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omits or misstates them during the plea process if the omission or misstatement did 
not cause the defendant to plead guilty when he otherwise would not have. 
Presuming prejudice does nothing to prevent infringing defendants' rights; it 
merely grants a windfall to defendants suffering from nothing more than "buyer's 
remorse/' Moreover, plea errors are not the kind of errors that warrant presuming 
prejudice. In the context of constitutional errors, the United States Supreme Court 
has presumed prejudice when the "'consequences [of the error] are necessarily 
unquantifiable and indeterminate . •. / " United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 
2557,2564 (2006) (citation omitted). 
In this case, the effect of the alleged plea errors on defendant's decision to 
waive his trial rights and plead guilty can be quantified: none. As detailed in point 
B.3 above, defendant's decision to plead guilty had nothing to do with the plea 
errors that he alleges. The record does not support concluding that any of the 
alleged errors caused defendant to plead guilty when he otherwise would not have. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18,110,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between 
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cat, 654 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 
1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral 
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Respectfully submitted May 21,2007. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
J6m?ey S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
: GUILTY PLEA 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
JUAN CARLOS DIAZ-AREVALO, : Case No. 051903158FS 
Defendant. : JUDGE ROBIN REESE 
Counsel, NISA J. SISNEROS, on the request of Defendant Juan Diaz-Arevalo, 
hereby moves this Court to allow Defendant to withdraw of his plea of guilty pursuant to §77-13-6, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
Mr. Diaz-Arevalo was charged with Criminal Homicide, a First Degree Felony; 
Possession of a Firearm by Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony; Commission of Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child, a Third Degree Felony; and Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony. On May 15, 2006, Mr. Diaz-Arevalo pled guilty to 
Criminal Homicide; Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted Person; and Commission of Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child. At that time two pending cases were also dismissed in their 
entirety. When a guilty plea is entered, the defendant must be "fully informed of his rights prior to 
pleading guilty" in order for the plea to be knowing and voluntary. State v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 101 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2002). Mr. Diaz-Arevalo believes that his interested have not been adequately represented 
by counsel throughout the proceedings. He does not feel as though counsel has substantially 
represented his position. Hence, Defendant believes his plea was not "knowingly" made. Mr. Diaz-
Arevalo has further expressed his concerns in a letter filed with the court. He would also like the 
opportunity to address his issues at the hearing in this matter. 
Therefore, Mr. Diaz-Arevalo moves this court to withdraw his guilty plea in this case. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 
ffiROS 
ttorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Patricia Parkinson, the Office of 
the District Attorney, 111 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this ^ day of August, 
2006. 
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